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lace is the central theme of this issue of EAP.
Since the late 1970s, the concept of place has
arisen as a major focus of theory and practice
in disciplines and professions ranging from philosophy, geography, and sociology, on one hand; to architecture, landscape architecture, and environmental education, on the other.
Place is powerful conceptually and practically
because, by its very nature, it gathers worlds spatially and environmentally, marking out centers of
human action, intention, and meaning that, in turn,
contribute to its making.
This issue begins with a review of political scientist Douglas Rae’s City, a wide-ranging study of
traditional urban place as founded in lively street
life and vibrant city districts. Rae’s real-world focus
is the shifting social and economic geography of the

www.arch.ksu.edu/seamon/EAP.html

Fall ▪ 2004

streets, neighborhoods, and districts of New Haven,
Connecticut, the city he draws on to typify traditional urbanism in America (see photograph below).
Next, philosopher Jeff Malpas, whose Place
and Experience has received consider coverage in
recent issues of EAP, provides a response to recent
commentaries on his work by educator John Cameron and philosopher Ingrid Stefanovic.
Last, philosopher Bruce Janz, webmaster of the
excellent website “Reach in Space and Place,” provides an autobiographical account of his growing
interest in place as a concept to foster interdisciplinary and inter-professional research and practice.
We continue to be short of material for future
EAPs. Please send essays, drawings, reviews, commentaries, news of interest, and so forth. As always,
we particularly appreciate student work.

From Douglas Rae’s City: Urbanism and Its End (p. 90): A New Haven, Connecticut grocery store with female
staff (center) and neighborhood children (right), c. 1895. See review, p. 5. © 2003 Yale University.
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Items of Interest

buildings and instead embraced buildings that literally make us ill.” www.sacredarchitecture.org/

Technology and the Body is a conference to be
held 4-6 November, 2004, at the Canada Science
and Technology Museum, Ottawa, Canada. Themes
covered include: The Built Environment, Medicine,
Clothing and Adornment, Body Enhancement, Athletics, and The Body Expressive. Speakers include
Galen Cranz, who discusses “Body-Conscious Design.” Go to: www.sciencetech.technomuses.ca

Human Studies is a scholarly journal devoted to
“advancing the dialogue between philosophy and
the human sciences. It addresses issues such as the
logic of inquiry methodology, epistemology, and
foundational issues in the human sciences exemplified by original empirical, theoretical, and philosophical investigations. Phenomenological perspectives, broadly defined, are a primary, though not an
exclusive focus.” A online sample of the journal,
including submission and ordering information, is
available at: www.wkap.nl/journals/huma.

The Car in History is a conference to be held 2021 May, 2005, at the Department of History and
Munk Centre for International Studies, University
of Toronto. This interdisciplinary conference focuses on the history of the car in North America
from the perspective of technology, business, cultural landscape, and popular culture. Contact:
steve.penfold@utoronto.ca

The Society for the History of Technology
(SHOT) is an interdisciplinary organization devoted to the study of the historical development of
technology and its relation to culture, politics, economics, and social change. The group publishes the
quarterly journal Technology and Culture. Contact:
jlorder@jhupress.jhu.edu.

The Institute for Sacred Architecture is a nonprofit organization of architects, clergy, educators
and others interested in the discussion of significant
issues related to contemporary Catholic architecture. The group publishes the bi-annual Sacred Architecture, which includes articles and reviews outside the Catholic tradition. For example, the
fall/winter 2002 issue includes Nikos A. Salingaros’
“Anti-Architecture and Religion,” which asks “why
the world [has] renounced emotionally-nourishing

Diversity in Design: the Journal of Inclusive Design Education is a new academic on-line publication sponsored by the Center for Inclusive Design
and Environmental Access (IDEA) at the University
of Buffalo. Contact: tauke@ap.buffalo.edu.

Citations Received

Craig Holdrege, 2003. The Flexible Giant: Seeing
+the Elephant Whole. Ghent, NY: The Nature Institute.

Andrés Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, & Robert
Alminana, 2003. The New Civic Art: Elements of
Town Planning. NY: Rizzoli.

Holdrege is a major figure in Goethean science, and here he
applies Goethe’s “phenomenology of nature” to the elephant.
His method is to “continually return to the question, ‘Who are
you, elephant?’ The idea of the coherent organism, formed as
a question, becomes the guiding light of inquiry.
“The challenge is to articulate this unity—to make it visible to our understanding. To do this demands a particular kind
of attention and inner activity.
“First, when I have come to a certain grasp of some area
in detail, instead of just progressing further in analysis I make
myself—which is not easy—step back and ask, ‘How does
this relate to the whole?’ I may not yet have an answer, but by
trying to place every detail into the larger context, I make sure
I am not losing sight of the animal in all its parts” (p. 3).

Largely composed of drawings, plans, and photographs arranged from larger to smaller scale, this lavishly-produced
volume seeks to provide “an exposition of excellent urban
design.” As major figures in the New Urbanist movement, the
authors argue that “expert design is a necessary element of
urbanism. Policy and administration are not enough to promote re-investment in old places or the development of compact, diverse, walkable new places.” The design examples
offered are said to provide “a manual of proven practice.”
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and how do they condition the experience of the holy within
the church’s walls?
“But the question is also one about the gradual accumulation of impressions gained in repeated experience of worship
within the church: how does sustained exposure to a building
and its markers of sacrality lead to deeper and richer understanding?” (p. 10).

Thomas Dacosta Kaufmann, 2004. Toward a Geography of Art. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
This art historian examines “how notions of place, of the geographical, have been inflected into writing about change
through time as it has been and is still discussed in art history”
(p. 6).
He considers how “the impact of the consideration of the
spatial dimension on previous discussions of art and architecture, where and when art and architecture have been thought to
have a historical dimension” (ibid.).
Unfortunately, the author seems largely unaware of the
considerable value a phenomenological focus might offer in
exploring such issues. In fact, the author is downright hostile
to Christian Norberg-Schultz, the one architectural phenomenologist briefly discussed, whose work is written offas a
“mysticization of place” (p. 95). Heidegger’s ideas are similarly dismissed.

From The Luminous Ground
A few years ago I went to mass in Salzburg’s
great cathedral….The high point of this mass was
the Sanctus. Full choir, slowly increasing rhythm,
deep sounds of the organ and the basses, high
song of the trebles, the church filled, the air became tense with the presence of this mass…
poised, in the Sanctus, as if on the edge of some
awakening, and the enormous cave of the building, allowing the sound to roll and fill our minds.
I stood there with my thoughts. At the most
awe-inspiring moment, a young man pushed forward to a telephone mounted on one of the columns of the nave. He picked it up and listened.
The telephone was tied to a tape-recording, giving interesting facts for tourists. He listened to the
tape-recording of dates and facts, white the Sanctus blazed around him.
This man became a symbol for me of the loss
of awe and of our loss of sense. Unable to immerse himself in the thing which filled the air and
surrounded us, perhaps even unaware of the
beauty which surrounded him, unaware of the
size and importance of the sounds that he was
hearing, he was more fascinated to listen to a
tape-recording reeling off the dates when the cathedral was built. For a while, during the 20th century, this has become our world: a place where the
difference between awe and casual interest had
been sanded down to nothing.
But I realized on that day that this young
man’s behavior could summarize what my efforts
as an architect have been about. All the efforts I
have made have, at their heart, just this one intention: to bring back our awe… and to allow us to
begin again to make things in the world which
can intensify this awe (pp. 334-35).

Christopher Alexander, 2004. The Luminous
Ground [vol. 4 of The Nature of Order]. Berkeley,
CA: Center for Environmental Structure.
This last volume of The Nature of Order examines “the way in
which architecture—indeed, all order in the world—touches
the inner human person, our being.” In the box, right, we reproduce one short section from this book.
[Note: as of September, volume 3 of the series—A Vision of a Living World—had not yet been published, we suspect because of the large number of illustrations that volume
appears to contain.]

Richard Kieckhefer, 2004. Theology in Stone:
Church Architecture from Byzantium to Berkeley.
NY: Oxford University Press.
This excellent book by a professor of theology is grounded in
“an urge to see more clearly what churches have meant and
what they can mean for communities that build and use them”
(p. vii). Kieckhefer’s aim is to “find aspects of church architecture so basic that they can usefully guide everyone’s perception of any church…” (p. 10).
These “aspects” he identifies as four, which he introduces in the form of four questions: “To ask how a church is
used is first of all to ask about the overall configuration of
space: How is it shaped, and how does its design relate to the
flow, the dynamics of worship?
“The question of use is secondly a question about the
central focus of attention, if any, within the church: what is the
visual focus, and how does it make clear what is most important in worship?
“To inquire about the reaction a church evokes is to ask
first about the immediate impact it makes on a person walking
through the door: what aesthetic qualities come to the fore,
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Many memorable case studies of many church types and
a major contribution to the phenomenology and hermeneutics
of sacred space and sacred architecture, though Kierckhefer
does not mention these conceptual traditions directly.

rather have been willing to join some of the most political and
quotidian realities facing people today.”
On the other hand, “the New Urbanists should not force
all those concerned with the future of urbanism to get on their
bandwagon…. Designers should learn from the past that there
are no singular solutions to our urban problems and that no
single, one-dimensional approach to urban design can or
should shoulder such a monumental and intractable task.”

Yodan Rofé, 1995. Space and Community: The
Spatial Foundations of Urban Neighborhoods,
Berkeley Planning Journal, vol. 10, pp. 107-25.

Michael Southworth & Eran Ben-Joseph, 2003.
Streets and the Shaping of Towns and Cities. Washington, DC: Island Press.

This article provides a useful overview of approaches to the
spatial and morphological aspects of neighborhood, drawing
on the work of Kevin Lynch, Jane Jacobs, Bill Hillier, M. R.
G. Conzen, Anne Bernez Moudon, and Michael Southworth.
Rofé concludes that “the spatial foundation of neighborhoods may be increasingly important in a world where people
move often and thus have less time to develop local attachments, and in a pluralistic world where the integrative force of
religious or other central institutions is in decline. Spatial
proximity and civilized, shared use of public space can help
weave the fabric of an otherwise fragmented society.”

Originally published in 1997 [for a review see EAP, spring
1997], this new edition includes a revised and updated introduction. The book traces the history of street design and layout
and suggests ways to make current pathway systems more
integrated and user-friendly. Sadly, there is still no discussion
of Bill Hillier’s space syntax, a point of view crucial to creating the kind of humanized street networks the authors hope to
facilitate.

Edward Robbins, 2004. New Urbanism, in Edward
Robbins & Rodolphe El-Khoury, eds. Shaping the
City: Studies in History, Theory and Urban Design.
London: Routledge.

Edward T. White, 2004. Travel Drawing: Engaging
the Spirit of Place. Tallahassee, FL: Architectural
Media.

A useful overview of New Urbanism, including positive and
negative critiques. Robbins concludes that the New Urbanists,
“unlike so many of their postmodern brethren in design [have]
not walked away and refused to face substantive problems to
which design may be able to make a solution. They have not
hid behind an apolitical relativism and elitist poetics but,

This book “addresses the challenges and joys of finding a
drawing subject, planning, the sketch, and producing the drawing on site. The emphasis is “travel drawing as a series of
mindful rituals and the inner secret, personal, spiritual aspects
of drawing on the road.” Includes 238 travel sketches.

Book Review: Understanding Urban Place
Douglas Rae, 2003. City: Urbanism and its End. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

P

olitical scientist Douglas Rae’s City is a perceptive examination of traditional American
urbanism grounded in lively streets, mixed
uses, and a place-based commingling of citizenry
different in race, ethnicity, and class.
Using New Haven, Connecticut as his case
study, Rae creatively draws on archival materials to
portray the everyday social and economic geography of the American city from the 1870s to the
1920s. He demonstrates the crucial importance of a
locally-grounded network of human relationships

founded in and sustaining urban businesses, civic
organizations, and municipal government.
Rae also documents how, from the 1920s onward, the traditional American city unraveled, overwhelmed by new technologies, changing economic
forces, regional decentralization, and federal policies that gradually enervated the earlier robust street
life. Though he concludes that we can never recreate the old urbanism, Rae believes that we might
improve today’s cities by understanding and remaking old urbanism’s best features—“the magic of
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small commitments to place, the value of strangers
in ordinary life, the humanity of well-ordered sidewalks…” (p. 31).

Fabric of Enterprise
In the era of urbanism, one could very nearly
describe the city as a vast network of implicit
conspiracies between businesses and their customers. City life was sustained by a layered fabric of business relationships—large firms and
small, wholesale and retail, engaged in manufacturing or distribution, providing transportation or
accommodation, creating housing or health services or entertainment or any of a hundred other
things people will pay for.
Businesses which survived for any length of
time came to know their best customers and
learned to accommodate their needs.
Perhaps the accommodation was nothing
more than a cheerful greeting; perhaps it came to
knowing that the customer wanted his shirts
starched. Perhaps the accommodation provided a
retail grocer with the freshest green goods at a
slight price premium.
Perhaps, more substantially, it was an agreement on a better price in return for a standing
order. Being a citizen of the city meant, among
other things, being wrapped up in this web of
relationships, being “a somebody” as one produced, sold, bought, and consumed the stuff of
everyday life (pp. 73-74).

A Day-to-day Vitality
For a phenomenology of urban place, Rae’s most
revealing discussion is chapters 3-6, which, through
superb archival documentation, reconstruct the dayto-day vitality of New Haven’s neighborhoods and
their underlying interpersonal, social, and economic
foundations.
In chapter 3, Rae examines the city’s “social
geography of business” by describing the rich fabric
of neighborhood stores that not only sold goods and
services but also played a central role in governing
“sidewalks and the people who walked on them” (p.
xiii) [see box, right].
Just as importantly, Rae considers how this
dense structure of neighborhood retailing began to
collapse—for example, the vulnerability of small
enterprises to larger operations like chain stores that
generated increasingly efficient economies of scale
and thus undercut prices.
Rae finds that chain stores in New Haven appeared as early as 1913 and by 1950 had destroyed
most neighborhood shops. The city’s locality-based
business geography also depended on a “permissive
treatment of mixed-use neighborhoods by government,” a civic attitude that would be replaced by the
mentality of single-use zoning, which New Haven
adopted in 1926.
Chapter 4, “Living Local,” describes the intimate connectedness between residents and their urban world—so much so, Rae suggests, that most
residents could not imagine themselves in any way
separate or distinct from that world:

Again largely through maps, Rae considers the
residential geography of New Haven’s working and
affluent classes [see maps, following pages]. Almost
all employees, whether factory workers or Yale professors, lived near their jobs. Sometimes the bestpaid and working-class citizens lived close to each
other, though Rae also finds that there were important boundaries that marked the well-to-do
neighborhoods from the rest of New Haven.
These urban dwellers might not like all the
ways the city contributed to their daily life, but the
resulting world was inescapable: “the person’s sense
of well-being and her sense of the place’s wellbeing would be intertwined: it would be hard for her
to think all was well with her personally, or with her
family, if the neighborhood was going to hell” (p.

A fully grounded city citizen would work full time within her
city, would live her nights and evenings there, would educate
her children there, would routinely shop in stores there, would
worship there if anywhere, would live in a social network
pinned down on the city. Its streets, saloons, restaurants, corner stores, plant gates, ballparks, and many more very particular and localized features would organize her life. It would be
hard to say who she is without reference to her city (p. 11314).
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to enter into only a few of them” (p. 203). He explains:

114). One result was a kind of unself-consciously
reinforced urban civility whereby citizens of different ethnicity, race, and economic class more or less
“got on.”

The pressures of centered development, with factory jobs
abundantly available, was part of the story. The dense fabric
of enterprise, with perhaps three thousand retailers holding
down street-corner and mid-block sites throughout the working-class neighborhoods and the downtown, was at once a
normative force (‘eyes on the street’, as Jane Jacobs would
say) and a major layer of opportunity for each generation of
workers and their families.
The relatively thick layer of housing, thickest of all near
industrial plants, was of very uneven quality, yet its residents
appear to have regulated their neighborhoods with admirable
success. The joint impact of housing and retailing was almost
certainly a critical element of self-regulating urbanism (p.
203).

Above: New Haven’s grocery stores projected over trolley
lines and the city’s nine-square central grid, 1913 (p. 87).
Numbers indicate neighborhoods. All maps © 2003 Yale
University.

Above: Homes of corporate CEOs, projected over New
Haven’s upscale neighborhoods, 1913 (p. 129).

Self-Government in Place
In chapter 5, Rae examines the hundreds of volunteer organizations—football clubs, musical groups,
religious organizations, and the like—that provided
opportunities for community participation in New
Haven. These institutions, whether formalized or
informal, provided a kind of social capital that
played a major role for New Haven’s governance in
allowing “people to engage with one another, and to
build trust across lines of difference” (p. 204).
In chapter 6, Rae examines city government in
greater detail, finding it to be, most of the time,
honest and well-intentioned but not “particularly
farsighted or nimble….” (p. xiii). Rae concludes
that, in many ways, city government was marginal
to the economic and lived vitality of New Haven
because the era was a time of “self-governance” in
which “urban society regulated or resolved most of
its own conflicts, so that formal government needed

Above: Homes of Yale University professors, projected
over New Haven’s upscale neighborhoods, 1913 (p. 134).
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web of municipal agencies and boundaries that today too often work independently and thus fracture
and divide urban regions. He asks for a rethinking
of federal public housing programs, particularly the
need to find “less isolating ways to improve housing
conditions for the urban poor” (p. 424). He argues
that all levels of municipal government must be
simplified, and elected officials given more authority as they are also made more accountable.
Curiously, Rae suggests that so far the most important 21st-century effort to recreate the traditional
city is “New Urbanism,” the urban design movement
that seeks to create walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods where buildings of a uniform architectural
style shape coherent public spaces for neighborly sociability.
I agree with Rae that New Urbanism is a significant attempt to remake urban place, though it must
also be said that many New Urbanist projects remain
formalist stage sets rather than living places.
In this regard, Jane Jacobs’ Death and Life of
American Cities continues to be the single best understanding of the traditional city because her central
notion of “street ballet” recognizes and unravels the
intimate interconnectedness between urban lifeworlds
and designable qualities of the physical city—i.e.,
mixed primary uses, small blocks, concentration of
users, and range of building types.
Rae’s book provides valuable corroborating evidence for Jacobs’ street ballet, but practical guides for
making street ballet happen in today’s cities are better
found in Christopher Alexander’s theory of environmental wholeness and Bill Hillier’s theory of space
syntax.
Their ideas, coupled with Jacobs’, demonstrate
ways in which urban parts might better relate to city
wholes. Hillier’s work is pivotal because it uncovers
the inescapable relationship between pathway structure and the lively street ballet that graced Rae’s old
urbanism and must grace any city and its districts if
they are truly to be healthy urban places.

Above: Homes of New Haven clerks, 1913 (p. 125).

Remaking Urban Liveliness
A practical problem in recreating lively cities is that
Rae’s old urbanism just happened—it unfolded for
the most part spontaneously because of a particular
constellation of historical, geographic, economic,
and technological circumstances. If we are to reproduce lively urban places today, we must understand
self-consciously how these places work and how
physical design might contribute to their everyday
dynamism.
Unfortunately, Rae’s practical suggestions for
urban regeneration are sketchy and steeped in the
pragmatist ideas of conventional policy and planning. For example, he emphasizes, at the community level, the importance of historic preservation
and adaptive reuse as a way to conserve “the ambience of an earlier age” and suggests that, through a
renewed volunteerism, civic organizations might be
resuscitated.
In regard to changes at larger environmental
scales, he calls for a return to mixed-use zoning and
hopes for community building across the complex

—David Seamon
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Place and Topography:
Responding to Cameron and Stefanovic
J. E. Malpas
Jeff Malpas is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania. His Place and Experience (Cambridge
University Press, 1999) has major bearing on a phenomenology of place. In recent EAPs, we have published
commentaries on Malpas’ book by educator John Cameron (winter 2004) and philosopher Ingrid Stefanovic
(spring 2004). Here, Malpas responds to these commentaries. Jeff.Malpas@utas.edu.au © 2004, J. E. Malpas.
tion, as I use the terms they have a very similar
meaning.3
As an explicitly cited notion, topology appears
only quite late and rarely in Heidegger’s thinking.
As I have argued elsewhere, however, a topological
approach can be seen to underlie much of Heidegger’s work both early and late.4 In spite of the shifts
in his thinking that occur between the 1920s and
1950s, all of his work can be seen as an attempt to
articulate, that is to ‘say’, the unitary place in which
things come to presence, in which they come to be.
The place at issue here (which appears in various guises as the ‘Da’ of Dasein, as the lighting/clearing, die Lichtung, that is the happening of
the truth of being, as the gathering of the Fourfold
in the Ereignis) is itself constituted only through the
inter-relations between the originary and equiprimordial elements themselves appearing within it.
In Being and Time those elements are delineated through the analysis of being-in-the-world and
unified in the structure of care and temporality; in
“The Origin of the Work of Art,” they are seen in
terms of the originary strife between earth and
world; in the Beitrage, as well as later essays such
as “Building Dwelling Thinking,” it is the interplay
between earth and sky, gods and mortals that is seen
as providing the basis (the ‘ground’ even) for the
gathering of world.

lace and Experience has, as it subtitle, “a
philosophical topography.” The phrase is
not intended merely to indicate the book’s
orientation to place as the central concept in its
analysis, but also to draw attention to a particular
methodological orientation within the work, a
methodological orientation that looks to give primacy to a non-reductive and relational mode of
analysis, while also acknowledging a connection to
Martin Heidegger’s characterisation of his own
thinking as a ‘Topologie des Seyns’—a topology of
being.1
Although neither Ingrid Stefanovic nor John
Cameron make any reference, in their comments on
Place and Experience, to the idea of topography as
such, the issues that they each discuss are directly
connected with that idea. Indeed, I am grateful to
Stefanovic and Cameron, not only because it is always gratifying to be able to engage in dialogue of
this sort, but also because they give me the opportunity, in responding to their comments, to say a little
more about what a philosophical topography involves. 2

P

Topography and Heidegger
To begin with, however, I should say something
about topography as it relates to Heidegger’s work,
since this is where much of Stefanovic’s discussion
has its focus. Heidegger talks, of course, not of topography, but rather about topology, and while this
can be taken to imply a slightly different orienta-

Topography in Place & Experience
The topography at work in Place and Experience
operates in similar fashion to this Heideggerian to-
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pology in that it looks to understand the way in
which experience comes to be in place (where experience is understood just in terms of the appearing, the coming to presence of things) through the
interplay between the embodied agent, the environment in which agency occurs (and so also the
things upon which agency acts), and the other
agents with whom agency is invariably coordinated
(whether linguistically or otherwise), an interplay
in which no one of these can be given priority.
Subjectivity and objectivity are seen as similarly reciprocally determined notions neither of
which can be taken as the sole basis for the larger
structure of which both are part. Place is presented
as the underlying ground here, not as something that
stands beneath these elements as some determinate
entity, but rather as itself constituted through the
interplay of those elements (as Heidegger’s Fourfold, and so the World, is constituted through the
play of earth, sky, gods and mortals), while also
constituting the unitary frame within which those
elements themselves come to presence.
These ideas are, of course, difficult to summarise without making them dense and perhaps even
opaque, but they are ideas that are set out at greater
length in Place and Experience and elsewhere.
What is perhaps most important in relation to Stefanovic’s comments is to see the way in which this
account of the grounding role of place involves a
reconceptualisation and reappropriation of the notion of ground as such.
Such a reconceptualisation and reappropriation
seems to me to lie at the very heart of Heidegger’s
own thought—it is part of the task of remembrance
that is required if we are to overcome, in some way,
the forgetfulness of being that is characteristic of
metaphysical thinking.5

But such issues were certainly not far away in
my thinking, and the final chapter of the book does
begin to move in the direction of the ethical through
the way in which it takes up issues of mortality, finitude, and fragility.
But Cameron has noticed something that is
perhaps more important here, and that is the way in
which the conceptual and methodological core of
Place and Experience, what I have been talking
about in terms of topography, must also underpin
any attempt to arrive at an ethics and politics of
place, and more specifically, the special role that
narrative has in this regard.
Narrative certainly has a central role in my discussion of place, partly because of the role of memory in the constitution of identity and because of the
way I treat memory as itself place-bound, but also
because of the way I understand place as itself constituted in terms of agency and movement.6 The
narratives of place are thus the narratives that come
with the pathways that open up in and through a
landscape, with the possibilities and modes of action that are built into a room, a building, a plaza, a
city street, with the saliencies that emerge from engagement with a particular thing or task.
This is, admittedly, a broader use of narrative
than the term may traditionally lead us to expect,
but it is a use of the term that also picks up on the
ways in which place, landscape, country and so
forth are narratively articulated within many Indigenous cultures, including those of Aboriginal
Australians.

A Poetics of Place
If we understand place as tied to narrative in this
way, and of narrative as tied to place in its turn, then
inasmuch as our belonging to place must be foundational to any attempt to think place in ethical terms,
so we must understand that belonging as essentially
underpinned by a dense and interconnected set of
narratives—narratives that are constantly being remembered, re-formed and re-articulated.
The articulation of place is also an articulation
of ourselves—it is thus that ethics enters centrally
into the picture. But it is also an articulation that
cannot be undertaken in any general or abstract
way. While we can map out the topography of the

Place as Underpinning
It is largely because my aim in Place and Experience was to set out the conceptual and methodological underpinnings for my account of place—to
set out, one might say, the basic idea of topography
as such—that Place and Experience has, as John
Cameron correctly notes, very little explicit discussion of the ethics and politics of place
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concepts at issue here, in the end, the articulation of
place is a matter of the articulation of the particular
pathways, activities, directions, and concrete relations in which we are already enmeshed. The techniques that are needed in such articulation are the
techniques that we have always used: story, song,
poem, painting, sculpture, dance—all provide ways
by which both place and so ourselves can be spoken, recognised and, in some part, understood.
In this latter respect, the ethics of place is also a
poetics, and this, perhaps, is one of the main lessons
to be drawn from Heidegger’s own talk of ‘topology’: logos and topos are not separate from one
another, but are already intimately bound together
in poiesis. Moreover, as Heidegger understands
matters, it is precisely the bringing into view of this
belonging-together of topos, logos and poiesis that
is the task of the thinker.

3. My preference, in Place and Experience, for topography over topology is largely determined by
the need to distinguish between my own topoanalysis and that of mathematical topology, while at
the same time drawing on associations with the
techniques of triangulation and traverse associated
with old-fashioned topographical surveying. Elsewhere, however, I have employed the language of
topology that is favored by Heidegger, who understands it more specifically as a ‘saying of place.’
4. See “From the transcendental to the topological:
Heidegger on unity, ground and limit,” in J. E. Malpas, ed., From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and
the Idea of the Transcendental (London: Routledge,
2003); and more particularly “Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World,” in Steve Crowell and J.
E. Malpas, eds., Heidegger’s Transcendentalism
(forthcoming, 2005).

Notes

5. Indeed, the idea of ground (‘der Grund) is the
focus for two key works: “Das Wesen des Grundes,
1929,” and Der Satz vom Grund (1955/56).

1. See “Seminar in Le Thor 1969,” in Seminare, Gesamtausgabe 15 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann,
1986), p. 344.

6. Edward Casey has also picked up on the centrality of narrative here, although he sees it in more
problematic terms—see our exchange in Philosophy
and Geography, 4 (2001).

2. Unfortunately, this brief reply will not allow me
properly to discharge the debt I owe to John Cameron to say more about the ethical and political implications of such a topography—it is an issue that I
intend to address on another occasion.
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The Hermeneutical Circle of Place

he recent movie The Terminal, starring Tom
Hanks, raises an interesting question: Is it
possible for a non-place to become a place?
Marc Augé declared the airport terminal to be the
quintessential non-place, the place which has exhausted its symbolic force.1 All symbols point outside—the airport is, after all, a place of transit, a
perennial deferral, not a place where people look for
some sort of intrinsic meaning
And yet The Terminal suggests that, under the
right conditions, even non-places can be places.
Nothing is so symbolically or hermeneutically
bankrupt that place cannot (re)establish itself. Furthermore, place itself is not stable. It comes and
goes, emerges and recedes. While we often think of
place in terms of stability or rootedness, we also
must recognize that this stability is actually a useful
fiction. Places are not only spatially particular but to
some extent temporally particular as well. 2
Place is not, however, simply arbitrary, and that
is what interests me as a philosopher. Historically,
philosophers have tended to focus on permanences
and, preferably, universals. Even those who focus
on particulars do not forget universals. Aristotle, for
instance, paid attention to the physical as a means to
reach the ideal world contained within. Husserl distilled experience to find its universal phenomenological core. In many cases, universality is what is
left at the end of philosophical reflection. It is either
the prerequisite or the goal of philosophical thought.

Being a philosopher means feeling the tug of the
universal. Being a philosopher today means understanding the problematic nature of that tug. For
many, it is no more than a siren song, beautiful and
nostalgic but ultimately futile, coercive, bound to
overlook vast areas of human experience and
probably evidence of white middle-class heterosexual male privilege. Universals, especially for philosophers who want to remain credible in contemporary cultural theory, must be avoided at all costs.
In the case of place, my sense has always been
that there is a gulf between those who deal only
with the particularities of place and those who deal
with place as a universal concept (that is, a concept
that is applied to or generalized over the particulars,
rather than derived from them). I have been uneasy
with both of those options. Places cannot be irreducibly particular—they become available inasmuch as they are imagined in the context of (or in
the absence of, nostalgia for, anticipation of, memory of) other places.
But they also cannot be subsumed under some
universal, as instances of a type. To suppose that we
have understood a place when we are able to put it
in a category (“tourist destination”, “home”, “suburb”, “atrium”, “memorial site”) is to miss what is
human about a place. In some way, the particularities of place that are only available in human experience and the universals of place that make ex-
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ticularity, reducible to neither. It exists as a tension.
It exists between materiality and discourse, reducible to neither. And, like the airport terminal, that
tension animates it, making it both stable and always at the edge of emergence or decadence.

perience possible must be present at the same time.
This is the hermeneutical circle of place.

Particular and Universal Together
This hermeneutical circle has been in my peripheral
vision for most of my academic career, even though
I did not start by thinking about place as a concept
in its own right. My own interest did not begin with
the intense attachment to a particular place that
some feel, nor in the nostalgic yearning or loss of
place that has led others into the field.
Rather, I began with the history of mysticism.
My dissertation was on a German mystic named
Jacob Boehme (1575-1624). Boehme had little or
nothing to say directly about place, but he did have
a great deal to say about paying attention to the life
that animated and connected nature. I didn’t come
across the term genius loci until later, but it would
have fit Boehme’s mystical view of nature very
well.
What was significant in his thought was that he
posited the co-eternal nature of particulars with the
divine life that suffused them. In other words, particulars were not pale reflections of a universal
cause nor was the universal simply the particulars
all added together. He was neither a traditional theist nor a pantheist.
Instead, he held both in hand at the same time,
refusing to reduce one to the other. He refused to
solve the classical philosophical problem of the
many and the one, and in that refusal he recognized
that human life itself exists on borders and in tension.
He also recognized that there was a kind of motion through history, that this tension which described life did not remain the same at all times.
The change over time was described in a fairly rudimentary manner, as a dialectic, but at least there
was the possibility that the relationship created by
the tension could shift over time.3 Boehme offered a
model for taking universals seriously but never sacrificing particulars on their behalf, and taking particulars seriously but never seeing them as discrete,
unrelated atoms.
Boehme’s philosophy may seem a long way
from the concept of place, but the foundations are
laid here. Place lies between universality and par-

Place & Space Website
For both beginning and experienced researchers, Janz’s website, “Research on Place & Space,”
is an exceptional resource for exploring topics covered in EAP.
Recognizing that the notion of “place” has a
wide range of meanings for different philosophical,
practical, and disciplinary points of view, Janz
works to incorporate as many traditions and perspectives as possible. His aim is “to try to crosspollinate the notion of place across disciplines.”
After providing several broad entries such as
“what should I read first?” and “General websites”
and “Resources on place,” Janz organizes links by
three resource types: first, disciplinary focus; second, related terms (e.g., home, embodiment, cyberspace, and genius loci); and, third, synoptic (e.g.,
bibliographies, institutes, and courses). The site includes an advanced search engine.
To view the site, go to:

http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~janzb/place/

Interdisciplinarity and Place
My next stop on the way to place was the concept
of interdisciplinarity. For several years I was the
director of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research
in the Liberal Arts (CIRLA), at Augustana University College, in Alberta Canada.4 This center’s purpose was to promote interdisciplinary research and
teaching, a requirement that made it imperative to
think about what counted as interdisciplinarity.
Several of the center’s staff, including myself,
were rooted in hermeneutic philosophy, and it became clear that interdisciplinarity needed to be
more than the application of different disciplines to
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being asked to justify their territorial entitlement.
The result was that African philosophers turned to
various concepts, such as tradition, reason, culture,
language, and so forth, to identify elements in African society that were truly African and truly philosophical.
Most of these efforts, unfortunately, met with
mixed success, not because these concepts are not
intrinsic to philosophy, but because they cannot
serve the spatializing purpose. They cannot guarantee either that the thought that emerges is either
truly African or truly philosophical.
Moreso, the real problem is that the wrong
question is being asked. Instead of the spatializing
question, “Is there an African philosophy?” a question more related to place must be asked: “What is it
to do philosophy in this (African) place?” This is a
phenomenological and hermeneutical question, but
also has the capacity to take symbolic and social
constructivist concerns to heart.
The result of taking place seriously in African
philosophy is that the Eurocentric challenge is uncovered as an illegitimate one, and African philosophy can attend to the task of philosophically explicating life as it is lived in Africa. 5 This third stop on
the road to place suggested to me that, to understand
place, we need to understand the questions we ask.
Some questions are not platial questions but spatial
ones.

the same problem, or the attempt to find a metadiscipline that could organize all other forms of
knowledge, or the attempt to contain diverse methodologies within a single person.
What was needed was the actual encounter of
disciplinary methods and assumptions with those of
other disciplines. If left to itself, a discipline such as
philosophy might imagine itself to be the queen of
all other disciplines, but that hubris could not be
maintained when those engaged in philosophy were
brought into dialogue with other disciplines. Philosophy’s blind spots become apparent, as well as
its strengths.
What does this dilemma have to do with place?
It seemed to me that I would better understand philosophy’s approach to place if I talked to nonphilosophers. It also seemed to me that philosophy
might have something to offer the academic discourse on place, not as the one discipline that could
theorize place for others, but rather as a way of approaching place that had a set of specific concerns
and abilities and which had a particular history in
relation to the concept. Philosophy has a place, in
all senses of the phrase.

African Philosophy and Place
My third stop on the way to place was African philosophy. Again, this may seem to have little to do
with place, but appearances are deceiving. What
interested me in African philosophy was that, as a
relatively new area within the discipline of philosophy (putting to the side for the moment the claims
of priority of Afrocentrism, and the historical philosophical texts and traditional wisdom which can
be found in various parts of Africa), African philosophy was under a constant challenge.
The challenge was one of self-defense–
European philosophy continually challenged African philosophy to justify its existence. Over time,
this defense has become internalized so that a great
deal of work in African philosophy is of the form
“Here’s why this particular thinker or concept is
both truly African and truly philosophical.”
This struck me as a spatializing activity, in the
sense that African philosophers were assumed (by
Western philosophy) to have no intellectual territory
but were trying to claim some territory. They were

A Place Itself
There is a fourth stop on the way to place, and it is
not so much an area of research as it is a place itself. In the summer of 2003, I moved from 11 years
of teaching in Western Canada to Orlando, to the
philosophy department at the University of Central
Florida. While the department and university have
been congenial, Orlando itself struck me as a very
strange place indeed.
I first thought of Augé’s non-places, and
thought that Orlando might qualify as another example of a non-place. But the signifiers do not all
point outside—exactly the opposite. They point inside, as do most tourist destinations. Orlando is one
of the most popular tourist destinations in the world,
and inevitably the area becomes defined by that
fact. Instead of Augé’s non-places, Baudrillard’s
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regard critical methods coming from Foucault, Derrida, and others as not having come from a place—
that is, as not being a response to particular questions in a localized history of thought. This lacuna
does not invalidate the use of these critical strategies but does raise the question of how one can be
rigorous in recognizing that thought is rooted in
places and is a response to concerns that may not
exist in the same way elsewhere.

simulacrum came to mind (and of course, Disneyworld is almost the quintessential example).
Living in Orlando as a Canadian has forced me
to rethink my ideas of what makes a place. I have
rarely seen a stronger division between those who
see Orlando as either a non-place or a simulacrum
of a place on one hand, and those who see it as a
good place, possibly the very model of a good place
on the other.
For some Orlandoans, there is absence of culture; for others, profusion. For some, there is transience and lack of roots; for others, the place has
deep history. Some find strong communities and
coherent cultural narratives which give it a unique
character; others fail to find those narratives even
after many years and continue to sojourn in Orlando
rather than dwelling there. Is Orlando The Terminal? Is it wishful thinking, a playground, or perhaps
a nightmare? Explicating meaning becomes much
more difficult when it is conflicted at every turn.

2.

How does the discourse on place across the
disciplines shape our understanding of
place and our approach to it? Why does the
concept of place find such a contemporary renaissance? What are its purposes and the ranges of its
use?
This question became apparent to me as I developed a tool for the study of place, collecting references and central papers on the concept of place. I
thought this effort would be a preliminary task, a
kind of literature search. Two things became clear—
the task was endless (the amount of work on place
is staggering, far more extensive than I anticipated),
and this was no mere literature search. If place exists, in part, through the discourse about it, then collecting work on place amounted to a study of that
discourse and a contribution to place-making itself.
6
Eventually, the collection of resources became the
website Research on Place and Space [see box, p.
11].
I found it particularly interesting that the concept of place not only has multiple applications but
also applications that are in tension. Place may
point to the recovery of individuality in the face of
alienating mass society, or it may point to the recovery of community (and the subsumption of individuality) in the face of reductive modernity. Yet
again, place may point to stability or, as in the case
of The Terminal, to fluidity. If the threat to life is its
oversimplification (e.g., under an umbrella such as
globalization), then place is that which is chaotic or
complex. On the other hand, if a threat to life is its
complexity, place then becomes what is simple. Nature may be a place, indeed for some the quintessential place; or, nature may be a non-place if, as poet
Don McKay writes, place is “nature to which history has happened.” Tensions abound, and they become clearer as the uses across disciplines are made

Some Questions
These stops on the way to place have produced a
number of questions:

1.

How can philosophy take itself seriously as
an emplaced discipline? Philosophy has
rarely, if ever, understood itself as an intellectual pursuit that is affected by its places. It has
rarely connected itself with the situation from which
it comes (apart from identifying contingent philosophical traditions using national or ethnic descriptors, e.g., German or British philosophy). It has
rarely considered fieldwork, for instance, as a part
of philosophical method. It has rarely thought of its
“debts and duties,” to use a phrase of Derrida’s.
What would philosophy look like if it regarded
place not just as another concept for analysis but as
an integral part of its own self-construction?
This question is not only relevant to philosophy
but is a fruitful place to start. Most disciplines regard their methods and knowledge as beyond place,
as having no history and as the answer to universal
rather than contingent questions, even if the object
of their research is place itself. Even many practitioners of cultural studies who would be inclined to
value the particularity of human experience tend to
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preted. So the paradox exists in the very nature of
place itself, not as a later subjective interpretation
on an objective feature of the world. At the same
time, place is not just the product of subjectivity—it
is not all relative. Place, like reality, “bites back.”
Places resist some interpretations and reject others,
even as they make some possible.

apparent.

3.

What are places like at the edge of “placeness”? Can places die? Where do they
come from? What is the “other” of place –
globalization? Hyperreality? Limbo? If place is not
just seen as a kind of stasis or permanence, what
else might it be? And can it serve its purpose if it is
seen as transient rather than permanent?
In The Invention of Tradition, Eric Hobsbawm
and Terence Ranger argue that what has been seen
as simply rooted in time may in fact have an unexpectedly recent history.7 Does this invalidate the
tradition? Not necessarily, but it does require that
we think about the border between thought and its
other. Tradition is that which we are willing to not
think about, to regard as simply pre-rationally constitutive of identity. To regard tradition as having
recent history is to subject it to thought and, possibly, to raise questions about the identity which it
supports.
Place is like this. For many, its stability and
permanence are important because they legitimate
identity. But if place comes and goes, if it has a history like tradition, can it do the work that many
thinkers and practitioners want it to do? Can it
really support identity? We create place like we
sometimes create tradition, for good reasons. Places
tell us who we are at our best, but like tradition,
places tend to get out of hand and have the potential
as well to show us who we are at our worst. Thus,
the transitions of place, rather than just the stability
of place, is worthy of attention.

To me, the lesson in all this is clear. One’s path to a
concept matters, and the questions that can be raised
about that concept become available the more one is
clear on where the questions are coming from.

Notes
1.Augé, Marc. Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. London: Verso,
1995.
2. I am aware of the problematic phrasing here.
What if, as Edward Casey (e.g., Getting Back into
Place, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press,
1996) and others argue, place precedes space?
3. Boehme’s dialectical philosophy earned him the
title of the “first German philosopher” from Hegel.
4. Augustana University College is now the Augustana Faculty of the University of Alberta.
5. See my “Philosophy as If Place Mattered: The
Situation of African Philosophy,” Havi Carel and
David Gomez, eds. What Philosophy Is. London:
Continuum Publishers, 2004, pp. 103-115.

4.

How can places be both one and not one at
the same time? That is, how is it possible
that places can have both a unity and a contradiction of meaning at the same time? The easy
answer is to regard this paradox as one of subjectivity—we bring interpretations to places such that the
same place can be a completely different experience
for different people. But if place exists in a hermeneutical circle, then place itself is already inter-

6. For more on this, see my “Walls and Borders:
The Range of Place”, City and Community, forthcoming.
7. Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 1992.
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